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Abstract
In this paper a modified version of Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988) model of the bank
lending channel of monetary policy under asymmetric information is presented. If, aside
from reserve requirements, banks have to meet capital adequacy requirements as well, then
the results suggested by Bernanke and Blinder have to be amended in several respects.
Most noticeably, when the net worth constraint is binding, the efficacy of monetary policy
is severely lessened. Further, we are able to show that a positive relationship between
banks’ capital base and the real economy exists.
11 Introduction
Asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders leads to adverse selection and moral
hazard and, therefore, renders capital markets imperfect (e.g. Bester and Hellwig (1987),
Gertler (1988), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Taking informational capital market imperfections
as given, the conventional interest rate channel of monetary policy (money view) is
strengthened by a balance sheet channel as well as a bank lending channel. Both the balance
sheet channel and the bank lending channel are discussed under the so called credit view of
monetary policy (e.g. Bernanke (1993, 1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1996), Cecchetti (1999, 1995), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Hu (1999),
Hubbard (2001, 2000, 1995), Kashyap and Stein (1997a, 1997b), Mishkin (2001, 1996,
1995)). In a well-known paper Bernanke and Blinder (1988) elucidate the bank lending
channel, in which financial intermediaries (i.e. banks) have a dominant role to play, by
integrating a separate market for bank loans into the classic IS-LM-model. In their model
banking institutions do not hold any excess reserves and, as a consequence, the volume of
central bank reserves together with the reserve ratio determines the overall money supply in
the economy.
The purpose of the present paper is to extend the Bernanke-Blinder-model by taking capital
adequacy restraints into consideration, i.e. banks have to fulfill both reserve requirements and
capital adequacy requirements. The latter are of current interest because they play the
dominant role in the present-day Basle II discussion. Our modification has important
implications because the results derived by Bernanke and Blinder need to be amended in
several respects. The qualitative findings of Bernanke and Blinder are confirmed only if banks
have a large base of equity capital at their disposal, so that it is the reserve constraint which is
binding. If, on the other hand, banks’ net worth is low and, therefore, the capital adequacy
constraint is binding, then monetary policy is less effective than suggested by Bernanke and
Blinder. Furthermore, we are able to show that there is a positive relationship between banks’
capital base and the real economy.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section we briefly repeat how monetary policy
affects the real economy under the bank lending channel. Section 3 presents our modifications
of the Bernanke-Blinder-model, and section 4 concludes.
2 A Model of the Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy
To start the analysis, in this section we briefly present a modified version of the Bernanke-
Blinder-model of the bank lending channel of monetary policy (see also Freixas and Rochet
(1997, chap. 6.2.2) or Walsh (1998, chap. 7.3.1)).
Consider an economy with four kinds of agents, households (h), firms (f), banks (b), and
government (g) (including the central bank). Suppose that there are three types of assets –
money (D), bonds (B), and bank loans (L). Due to asymmetric information between borrowers
and lenders, bonds and loans are imperfect substitutes for both firms (on the right-hand side of
their balance sheets) and banks (on the left-hand side of their balance sheets). Assume further
that prices are sticky.
The households’ behavior is given by
),(),(),( iYBiYDiYS hh += .                 (1)
S are savings which are channeled to money (held in form of deposits only), hD , and bonds,
hB . Y denotes real income, and i is the interest rate on bonds. We assume that YS ∂∂ / ,
2iS ∂∂ / , YDh ∂∂ / , YBh ∂∂ / , iBh ∂∂ /  > 0 and 0/ <∂∂ iDh  holds. Especially, the higher Y and i
the more consumers save.
To finance investment, I, firms issue bonds, fB , or raise loans, fL . Therefore,
),(),(),( riLriBriI ff += ,                 (2)
where r denotes the interest rate on bank loans. Suppose that iI ∂∂ / , rI ∂∂ / , iB f ∂∂ / ,
rLf ∂∂ /  < 0 and rB f ∂∂ / , iLf ∂∂ /  > 0, i.e. as i and r increase firms invest less.
The representative bank’s balance sheet is
bbb DLBR =++ .                 (3)
The bank’s assets are reserves at the central bank, R, bonds, bB , and loans, bL . The liabilities
consist of deposits, bD , only.
Bernanke and Blinder suppose that banks do not hold any excess reserves. Thus, R equals
minimum reserves and the total money supply in the economy is determined by the multiplier
α/R , where α  is the reserve ratio. Inserting α/RDb =  into equation (3) and rearranging
terms yields
αα /)1( −=+ RLB bb .     (4)
The distribution of the amount of αα /)1( −R  to bonds, bB , and loans, bL , is the result of a
portfolio optimisation problem which, for the save of convenience, is not explicitly modeled
by Bernanke and Blinder. Here it is of only importance that a part of αα /)1( −R  goes to
bonds, and the remainder is invested in loans, i.e.
RriBb ),(υ= ,                 (5)
RriLb ),(µ= ,                 (6)
where i∂∂ /υ , r∂∂ /µ  > 0 and r∂∂ /υ , i∂∂ /µ  < 0 is assumed. Clearly,
ααµυ /)1(),(),( −=+ riri holds.
Finally, the government’s budget constraint is
gBRG += .                 (7)
In the model outlined so far there are four markets (i.e. commodity market, money market,
bond market and loan market) as well as three endogenous variables (Y, i and r). Due to
Walras’ law, the bond market may be ignored altogether, so that in the following we will
restrict our attention to the other three markets. The money market equilibrium condition, the
well-known LM-curve, is
),( iYDR hα= .                 (8)
The IS-curve represents the commodity market equilibrium, i.e.
),(),( iYSGriI =+ .                 (9)
Further, if
RririLf ),(),( µ=               (10)
holds, the loan market is cleared as well. Solving equation (10) for r yields
),( Rir φ= ,               (11)
and (by totally differentiating equation (10)) it is straightforward to show that 0/),( >∂∂ iRiφ
and 0/),( <∂∂ RRiφ . The intuition behind the signs of the partial derivatives is easy to
understand: First, when the interest rate of bonds, i, rises, firms issue fewer securities. Instead,
their demand for bank loans increases. At the same time banks reduce the supply of loans as
bonds get more attractive from their perspective. There is therefore an excess demand for
loans, and an increase in the loan rate, r, will follow. Second, if central bank reserves, R, rise,
banks offer more loans. As a result, there is an excess supply in the market for loans which in
turn decreases r.
3By inserting ),( Rir φ=  into the IS-curve the following expression is obtained:
( ) ),(),(, iYSGRiiI =+φ .               (12)
Bernanke and Blinder call equation (12) the CC-curve (commodities and credit) because it
represents all combinations of Y and i which ensure that the commodity market and the loan
market are simultaneously in equilibrium. By totally differentiating equation (12) it can
simply be shown that the slope of the CC-curve is negative, i.e. 0/ <dYdi . The negative
relationship between i and Y is straightforward to explain: An increasing bond rate, i, gives
rise to both an excess demand for bank loans as well as an excess supply of commodities. A
rising loan rate, r, brings the market for bank loans back to an equilibrium, but it aggravates
the situation of excess supply in the goods market. Therefore, real income, Y, has to decrease
until SGI =+  holds again. Note that in the ),( Yi -space the central bank reserves, R, are a
shift parameter of the CC-curve. This result has important consequences for the efficacy of
monetary policy. In figure 1 the implications of an expansionary monetary policy are
illustrated.
Figure 1: A monetary expansion and the bank lending channel
As under the interest rate channel of monetary policy (money view), an increase in reserves,
R, shifts the LM-curve to the right. Under the bank lending channel (as part of the credit view)
there is an additional effect: The CC-curve shifts to the right too. The reason for this is as
follows: An increase in central bank reserves, R, causes an excess supply of bank loans in the
loan market. As a result, the loan rate, r, declines. The decline in r in turn increases
investment, I. Thus, for a given bond rate, i, GI +  rises. Consequently, savings, S, and
therefore income, Y, has to increase until SGI =+  holds again. Put another way, the effect
of the LM-curve shifting to the right is reinforced by the CC-curve shifting to the right as
well. In the new equilibrium real income, Y, is higher. As for the new equilibrium value of the
bond rate, i, no unambiguous statement can be made. In figure 1 in the new equilibrium i is
higher than before, i.e. *** ii > . To sum up:
Proposition 1 (Bernanke und Blinder (1988)):
A change in the monetary base, R, shifts to the right both the LM-curve and the CC-curve.
Expansionary monetary policy increases real income, Y, and decreases the loan rate, r.
Restrictive monetary policy causes Y to decline and r to rise. The reaction of the bond rate, i,
is ambiguous.
4Proposition 1 has important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. Especially,
monetary policy can have real effects without influencing the interest rate on bonds in the
economy. If banking institutions have more central bank reserves at their disposal, then they
will offer more loans to firms, i.e. bL  increases. Particularly bank-dependent borrowers profit
from the increased supply of bank loans because, as a consequence of asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders, they have no direct access to organized securities markets.
3 A Model Including Capital Adequacy Requirements
In the CC-LM-model of the last section the volume of central bank reserves, R, together with
the reserve ratio, α, determines the overall money supply in the economy. The banking
sector’s balance total is α/RDb = . However, in the real world, aside from reserve
requirements banks have to meet capital adequacy requirements as well. Especially, the items
which are listed on the left-hand side of their balance sheets, i.e. bonds and loans, have to be
backed up at least partly with equity capital in order to protect depositors from banks going
bankrupt.1
In this section we extend the Bernanke-Blinder-model by adding a capital adequacy restraint
for banks. Both bonds, bB , and loans, bL , have to be underpinned with equity capital. To be
more precise, at least β⋅100 )10( << β  percent of the interest bearing assets have to be
backed up with the banks’ own resources.2
Suppose that E is the banking sector’s exogenous equity capital base. Consequently, the
representative bank’s balance sheet is
EDLBR bbb +=++ ,               (13)
and both
RDb ≤α              (14)
and
ELB bb ≤+ )(β               (15)
have to be fulfilled. Equations (14) and (15) represent the reserve constraint and the capital
adequacy constraint, respectively. Equations (1), (2), and (7) continue to describe the
behaviour of consumers, firms, and the government. As before, the banking institutions
behave perfectly passively in that they attempt to run down their excess reserves at the central
bank as far as possible. Crucial for the following analysis is whether the reserve requirement
or the capital adequacy requirement is binding. We start with the case in which equation (14)
holds with equality in the next subsection. The scenario of equation (15) holding with equality
is postponed to subsection 3.2.
                                                          
1 Today, according to the 1988 Basle Accord, banks’ liable equity capital has to be at least as large as eight
percent of their risk weighted assets. Starting in 2007 new instructions, contemporarily discussed under the
heading of Basle II, are supposed to come into force. The chief intention of Basle II is to take into account to a
greater extent the (externally or internally evaluated) risks of the banks’ assets when backing up the latter with
net worth. In other words, the riskier a loan is, the higher the required share which has to be underpinned with
equity capital. The planned new percentages are 20, 50, 100, and 150 percent of the aforementioned eight
percent, i.e. 1.6, 4, 8, and 12 percent.
2 In another context Blum and Hellwig (1995) analyse the macroeconomic consequences of reserve as well as
capital requirements which banking institutions have to meet. In their model the capital constraints affect loan
supply and investment in the economy too. Furthermore, a multiplier mechanism is at work. The main lesson
gleaned from Blum and Hellwig is that equilibrium prices and income react more sensitively to demand side
shocks when the capital adequacy restraint is binding.
53.1 Binding Reserve Constraint
When the banking sector is equipped with a large capital base, we have
bDR α=                          (14’)
and
)( bb LBE +≥ β ,               (15)
i.e. the reserve constraint is binding whereas the capital adequacy constraint is not. Therefore,
as in the preceding section, the overall money supply in the economy is α/RDb = . Apart
from reserves, R, banks have assets of
REDLB bbb −+=+  (13’)
at their disposal. Inserting α/RDb =  into equation (13’) and rearranging terms yields:
ERLB bb +−=+ α
α )1( .
By defining ERRM +−≡ αα /)1()(  the aforementioned equation is simplified to
)(RMLB bb =+ ,               (16)
where 0/)1(/)( >−= ααdRRdM . As in section 2, the allocation of )(RM  to bonds, bB , and
loans, bL , is the solution to a portfolio optimisation problem which is not explicitly modeled
here. Instead, we assume that a share υ  goes to bonds, and the remaining share of
)1( υµ −=  is invested in loans, i.e.
)(),( RMriBb υ= ,               (17)
  )(),( RMriLb µ= ,               (18)
where i∂∂ /υ , r∂∂ /µ  > 0 and r∂∂ /υ , i∂∂ /µ  < 0 is assumed. Note further that
1),(),( =+ riri µυ  holds.
As before, the LM-curve (i.e. equation (8)) and the IS-curve (i.e. equation (9)) represent the
money market equilibrium and the commodity market equilibrium, respectively. Finally, to
clear the loan market, bf LriL =),(  or rather
)(),(),( RMririLf µ=               (19)
must hold. Solving equation (19) for r yields( ))(, RMir φ= .               (20)
By totally differentiating equation (19) the partial derivatives of the function ( ))(, RMir φ=
can easily be determined. The solution to this is ( ) 0/)(, >∂∂ iRMiφ  and ( ) 0/)(, <∂∂ RRMiφ .
The intuition is straightforward: First, an increase in the bond rate, i, enhances firms’ demand
for loans, while, at the same time, it decreases the supply of bank loans. Thus, the result is an
excess demand for loans. To restore the equilibrium in the loans market the loan rate, r, must
rise. Second, an expansion of the central bank reserves, R, increases the supply of loans
offered by banks, and, therefore, an excess supply of loans follows. Consequently, the loan
rate, r, will decline.
Inserting ( ))(, RMir φ=  into equation (9) yields the CC-curve,
( )( ) ),()(,, iYSGRMiiI =+φ ,               (21)
which, as in section 2, represents all combinations of i and Y where both the goods market and
the loan market are in equilibrium. The CC-curve according to equation (21) has the same
characteristics as the CC-curve of section 2, i.e. equation (12). Its slope in the ),( Yi -space is
negative, i.e. 0/ <dYdi  (which is easy to see by totally differentiating equation (21)).
Furthermore, it shifts to the right when the central bank reserves, R, are increased. An increase
in R causes an excess supply in the market for bank loans which, then, is removed by a
6decline in the loan rate, r. As r falls firms’ investment is enhanced. Thus, for a given level of
the bond rate, i, GI +  is higher, and real income, Y, has to grow in order to give households
incentives to save more. The process of adjustment lasts until SGI =+  holds again.
Monetary policy has the same qualitative effects as in the original Bernanke-Blinder-model.
An increase of the monetary base, R, shifts to the right both the LM-curve and the CC-curve
(see figure 1 once again). Real income, Y, rises, but the reaction of the bond rate, i, is
ambiguous, i.e. i may rise or fall or keep the same equilibrium value as before.
As mentioned earlier, in the case of a binding reserve restraint banks have a broad base of
equity capital, i.e. E is high relative to R. That is, equations (14’) and (15) hold. Inserting
equation (16) into equation (15) and using the above definition of )(RM  we have
αβαβ )1/()1( −−≥ RE .                 (22)
The scenario of a binding reserve constraint is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 2:
If αβαβ )1/()1( −−≥ RE  holds, monetary policy (i.e. a change in central bank reserves) has
the same qualitative effects as in the original Bernanke-Blinder-model.
3.2 Binding Capital Adequacy Constraint
We now turn to the other case not yet studied in the literature in which the capital adequacy
constraint is binding and, therefore, determines the banking sector’s balance total. In this
scenario
bDR α>             (14’’)
as well as
)( bb LBE += β              (15’)
holds. Note that, with regard to equation (14’’), the central bank reserves, R, now embrace
both minimum reserves and excess reserves. We assume that excess reserves cannot be
invested in such interest bearing assets which need not be backed up with equity capital. Put
another way, the excess reserves are deposited with the central bank without earning interest.
Aside from reserves banks have assets of β/ELB bb =+  at their disposal. Note that there is a
multiplier mechanism at work. If banks’ net worth, E, increases by an amount of E∆ , then the
sum of )( bb LB +  goes up by more than E∆  (namely by β/E∆  > E∆ ). As usual, the
allocation of β/E  to bonds, bB , and loans, bL , is the solution to a portfolio optimisation
problem which we do not model explicitly here. Suppose that the optimal solution is
EriBb ),(~υ= ,               (23)
EriLb ),(~µ= ,               (24)
where iri ∂∂ /),(~υ , rri ∂∂ /),(~µ  > 0 and rri ∂∂ /),(~υ , iri ∂∂ /),(~µ  < 0 is assumed. Obviously,
βµυ /1),(~),(~ =+ irri  holds. Inserting from equations (13) and (15’) into ),( iYDD hb =  yields
),()1( iYDER h=−+ β
β .               (25)
Equation (25) is the well-known LM-curve. As usual, in the ),( Yi -space the LM-curve has a
positive slope, and it shifts to the right when the monetary base, R, increases (see figure 2).
However, the shift to the right following an increase in reserves is less than in section 3.2 in
which the reserve restraint is binding. If the capital adequacy constraint (15) holds with
equality, the money supply rises by the same amount as the reserves, R, i.e. RDb ∆=∆ . In
contrast, when equation (14) holds with equality, i.e. the reserve constraint is binding, a rise in
7the monetary base by an amount of R∆  causes the overall money supply to increase by
RR ∆>∆ α/ . Therefore, in comparison to the case in which the capital adequacy restraint
holds with equality, for a given bond rate, i, real income, Y, has to rise stronger in the scenario
with a binding reserve constraint to bring the money market back to equilibrium.
Note that banks’ net worth, E, is a shift parameter of LM too. If E goes up, the banking
institutions both offer more loans and acquire more bonds, i.e. bL  as well as bB  increase.
Because of β/)( ELB bb ∆=+∆  > E∆  the money supply, bD , rises in accordance with
equation (13). Taking the bond rate, i, as given, real income, Y, has to rise in order to restore
the money market equilibrium. Succinctly put, an increase in E shifts LM to the right.
Figure 2: Expansionary monetary policy and an increase in banks’ equity capital
As above, the IS-curve is represented by equation (9). The market clearing condition for the
loan market is
EririLf ),(~),( µ= .               (26)
Solving equation (26) for r yields
),(~ Eir φ= .               (27)
By first replacing µ  with µ~  and R with E in equation (10) and then totally differentiating we
obtain 0/),(~ >∂∂ iEiφ  and 0/),(~ <∂∂ EEiφ . The intuition regarding the signs of the partial
derivatives of the function ),(~ Eir φ=  is straightforward: First, if the bond rate, i, rises, an
excess demand in the market for bank loans is the result. Thus, the loan rate, r, will increase.
Second, when the banking sector’s equity capital base, E, rises, the supply of bank loans is
widened. An excess supply of loans immediately follows. Therefore, the loan rate, r, has to
decline to restore an equilibrium in the market for bank loans.
Inserting ),(~ Eir φ=  into equation (9) yields the CC-curve,( ) ),(),(~, iYSGEiiI =+φ .               (28)
The important point to note about the CC-curve according to equation (28) is that the position
of CC in the ),( Yi -space does no longer depend on the volume of central bank reserves, R,
but on the level of banks’ net worth, E. An increase in the capital base, E, shifts the CC-curve
to the right (as illustrated in figure 2). As the banking institutions posses more equity capital
the supply of bank loans increases. The result is an excess supply in the market for loans,
which has to be remedied by a decline in the loan rate, r. However, the decline in r makes
firms’ investment projects more profitable, so that I and, because G is exogenous, GI +  rise.
For a given bond rate, i, real income, Y, has to rise in order to induce consumers to save more.
8The increase in income will last until the commodity market is back in equilibrium, i.e.
SGI =+ . The central bank reserves, R, do no longer influence the position of the CC-curve
in the ),( Yi -diagram because a change in reserves has no effects on the loan market
equilibrium any longer.
In order for the capital adequacy constraint to bind, reserves, R, must be large relative to the
banks’ equity, E. Substituting from equations (13) and (15’) in bDR α>  and rearranging
terms yields
ER >−− )1(/)1( βααβ .              (22’)
It is important to note that the reaction of the bond rate, i, following a change in the monetary
base, R, is no longer ambiguous. As can be seen from figure 2, an increase in reserves, R,
unambiguously causes i to decline. The main results concerning monetary policy in the
scenario of a binding capital adequacy requirement are summarised in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3:
If )1(/)1( βααβ −−< RE , then monetary policy is less effective than suggested by Bernanke
and Blinder. The consequences regarding Y and i are unambiguous. An increase in the
monetary base, R, raises real income, Y, and decreases the bond rate, i, and vice versa.
Furthermore, as already explained above, the more net worth banks posses the higher is real
income in the economy because an increase in equity capital, E, shifts to the right both LM
and CC. There is therefore a positive relationship between E and Y. However, as for the new
equilibrium value of the bond rate, i, no clear-cut statement can be made, i.e. i may rise or fall
or remain constant depending on which curve shifts farther to the right. The consequences of
a rise in banks’ capital base are summed up in the next proposition.
Proposition 4:
A rise in banks’ equity capital base, E, has expansionary effects, i.e. real income, Y,
increases. Whether the bond rate, i, goes up or down is unclear.
4 Conclusion
In the real world, aside from reserve requirements banks have to meet capital adequacy
requirements as well. Therefore, net worth constraints should be taken into account when
modelling the conduct of monetary policy under symmetric as well as asymmetric
information. In the present paper we have extended the Bernanke-Blinder-model of the bank
lending channel of monetary policy under asymmetric information by adding a capital
adequacy constraint. Taking the latter as given, the process of generating money in an
economy can no longer easily be described by the conventional multiplier mechanism.
Banking institutions can run down their excess reserves at the central bank only if they have a
broad base of equity capital relative to the central bank reserves at their disposal. Banks with
little net worth cannot exchange excess reserves for interest bearing assets like bonds and
loans because if they did so, they could no longer meet the capital adequacy constraint, i.e. the
assets would not be backed up with a sufficient amount of equity capital anymore. Thus, the
efficacy of monetary policy is severely lessened when the banking institutions’ capital base is
low. Fortunately, in the intermediate run monetary policy may become more efficient again as
a rising gross national product leads to increased profits in the banking sector which in turn
increase banks’ equity capital base.
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